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1. 
 
  As John Dupré’s stimulating and illuminating paper (2013) attests, the notions of 
“mechanism” and “mechanistic explanation” are currently  “hot” topics within 
philosophy of science. A number of writers (hereafter mechanists) have proposed 
characterizations of these notions, often with added suggestion that at least in the 
biomedical sciences, explanations are, in actual practice,  and, as an ideal should be, 
mechanistic in nature or should proceed by representing biological systems as 
mechanisms.  For these writers, biological theorizing that is not appropriately grounded 
in or related to mechanism information is to that extent unexplanatory.  Dupré is skeptical 
of (at least) this last claim, writing that “there are good reasons to think that biological 
systems—organism, cells, pathways, etc.—are in many ways quite misleadingly thought 
of as mechanisms”.  He suggests instead the future of biological theorizing is likely to lie, 
at least so some considerable extent, with non-mechanistic forms of explanation, such as 
those provided by dynamical systems theory.  
I am broadly sympathetic to (and will largely defend) many of Dupré’s claims but   
I want to begin with a methodological (or meta-philosophical) concern.  An obvious 
worry raised by arguments over whether there are non-mechanistic forms of explanation, 
either in biology or elsewhere, or whether all biological systems are “machine-like”, is 
that such disputes are (or threaten to become) largely terminological or semantic—  the 
answer depends on what  is meant  by “mechanism”,  “mechanical explanation” and so 
on and these are notions without clear boundaries.  This worry is particularly pressing 
because different mechanists seem to have rather different views about how narrowly the 
relevant notions should be understood.  Some, like Craver (2008) and Craver and Kaplan, 
(2011) appear to adopt relatively restricted notions of mechanism.  In the case of   
mechanistic explanations in biology, these writers emphasize the importance of providing 
very specific, concrete  details concerning, e.g., molecular interactions and  their spatio-
temporal organization.  For such writers, dynamical systems theory and other more 
abstract forms of biological theorizing (such as those appealing to network structures of 
the sort described in Section 5 below) do not, in the absence of molecular or other sorts of 
low level detail, provide mechanistic explanations  or indeed explanations of any kind at 
all.  By contrast other writers, such as Bechtel (2011)  adopt a less restrictive conception 
of mechanistic explanation  and   think of at least some dynamical systems-type 
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explanations as “mechanistic”  (or  as providing information that  contributes to  the 
construction of mechanistic explanations). I suspect that such non-restrictionists will 
respond to many of Dupré’s examples of putative non- mechanistic explanations  by 
insisting that such explanations  are mechanistic after all, on some appropriate (and 
suitably rich) conception of this notion.  Restrictionists like Craver, by contrast, might 
well agree that Dupré’s examples fail to meet suitable standards for mechanistic 
explanation but will regard these examples as for that reason not explanations at all, 
rather than as non-mechanistic explanations.  
Given the desirability of avoiding this sort of terminological squabble, I propose 
to proceed as follows.   Because I think that Dupré is correct in supposing that there are 
important differences between the kinds of explanations he labels mechanical and those 
he calls non-mechanical (differences which I also think are taken to be important by 
many biologists) and because we need some way of referring to those differences, I will 
follow Dupré in talking in terms of a contrast between mechanical and non-mechanical 
forms of explanation.  Or, to be more precise, I will describe some explanations as “ more 
mechanical” than others or   as representing some biological systems as more “machine-
like” than others. In other words, I will use “mechanical “in a restricted sense, so that at 
least some explanations provided by, e.g., dynamical systems theory and by various sorts 
of network or topological structures  (see Section 5) do not count as mechanical .  I 
emphasize, however,  that this is largely a terminological convention.  What is really 
important are the differences (as well as the similarities) among the systems and 
explanations discussed below, and not the particular choice of words we use to label 
these differences.  I thus would not object in any fundamental way if someone were to 
insist that all of the explanations discussed below are “mechanical” in some broad sense, 
with the differences among them having to do with the fact that they exploit analogies 
with different sorts of machines (clocks versus structures with sophisticated feedback and 
distributed control) or different sorts of expectations about how machines will behave.   
Even given this terminological decision, several issues remain. One, already 
alluded to, is whether we should think of the mechanical/non-mechanical contrast as a 
sharp dichotomy or instead more in the nature of a graded (perhaps multi-dimensional) 
continuum, according to which some explanations are more “mechanical” than others (in 
various respects).  In part because the various features that I attribute to “mechanical” 
explanations below obviously come in degrees, I regard this “graded” conception as more 
appropriate. A second issue has to do with the extent to which, so to speak,  mechanical 
and non-mechanical forms of explanation necessarily compete with or exclude one 
another.  (Note that even if there are important differences between mechanical and non-
mechanical forms of explanation, it still might be the case that biological understanding is 
best advanced by combining elements of both.)  For reasons of space, I will not discuss 
this question, but my inclination is to think that a picture according to which these two 
varieties of explanation can reinforce or complement one another is often correct.   For 
example, the (relatively) non-mechanical explanations that appeal to network structure 
discussed in Section 5 may nonetheless build on  mechanism  information in the sense 
that the network itself is an abstract representation of facts about mechanistic 
relationships, even though it is generic features of the network topology and not the 
details of those mechanistic  relationships that, so to speak, drive the explanations 
provided.  
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With these preliminaries out of the way my plan is to proceed as follows. First 
(Section 2), I will describe two examples of machines or of systems whose behavior is 
represented or explained as mechanical—one a designed artifact and the other a 
biological system. I will  then (Sections 3-4) sketch my own account of mechanistic 
explanation   making use of the interventionist ideas about causation I have developed 
elsewhere (Woodward, 2003). This account will emphasize the way in which mechanistic 
explanations, at least in the biomedical sciences, integrate difference-making and spatio-
temporal information, and exhibit what I will call fine-tunedness of organization.  It will 
also emphasize  the role played by modularity conditions in mechanistic explanation. 
Section 5 argues that, given this account, it is plausible that there are forms of 
explanation that are relatively non-mechanical or depart from expectations one associates 
with the behavior of machines.   
 
II. 
 
     Consider the following 
 
 
Figure 1  
This structure is accompanied by the following “directions” which describe how the 
system is intended to work.  
 
1. Turn the handle on a toy cash register to open the drawer.  
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2. The drawer pushes a golf ball off a platform, into a small blue funnel, and down a 
ramp.  
3. The falling golf ball pulls a string that releases the magic school bus (carrying a picture 
of Rube Goldberg) down a large blue ramp.  
4. Rube's bus hits a rubber ball on a platform, dropping the ball into a large red funnel.  
5. The ball lands on a mousetrap (on the orange box) and sets it off.  
6. The mousetrap pulls a nail from the yellow stick.  
7. The nail allows a weight to drop.  
8. The weight pulls a cardboard "cork" from an orange tube.  
9. This drops a ball into a cup.  
10. The cup tilts a metal scale and raises a wire.  
11. The wire releases a ball down a red ramp.  
12. The ball falls into a pink paper basket.  
13. The basket pulls a string to turn the page of the book! 
 
Let us compare this with a representation of a machine-like biological structure: a 
diagram of the regulatory genetic network for endomesoderm specification in the sea 
urchin embryo, due to Davidson et al. (2002):  
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Figure 2 
  
Here the various arrows represent facts about relations of causal dependency—in 
particular that the expression of various genes or the activity of various proteins (e.g. in 
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binding to promoter regions) influence the expression of other genes. The diagram was 
constructed by a “perturbation analysis” in which expression of each of the different 
genes or signaling pathways represented was disrupted and  the causally downstream 
effects of such disruption noted. That is, the researchers intervened to alter, e.g., the 
expression of gene G and then observed what difference this made to the expression of 
other genes or signaling pathways, with the pathways or arrows in the diagram recording 
whether expression (or not) of G made a difference for various downstream events.  The 
arrows thus have broadly the same interpretation as the edges in directed graphs 
employed in causally interpreted Bayesian networks, as described in Woodward, 2003: 
that is, the arrows indicate that some causal dependence relation or other obtains between 
two relata (in the sense that there is  some change  in the state of one of the relata will 
lead to a change in the other relatum) without further specifying the details of this 
dependence relationship, such as its exact parameterization or functional form. The latter 
can be specified more precisely by means of equations   -- in the example under 
discussion,  Davidson et al.  claim this  can be  accomplished by equations that are   
“Boolean” in character -- that is,   by equations that involve relations like AND, OR, 
NOT etc.  For example, such an equation might tell us that if both X and Y are expressed, 
Z will be expressed but not otherwise.      
   Davidson et al.  explicitly describe this  diagram as  providing (or at least as 
contributing to) a “causal explanation” of  endomesoderm development. They also add  
that they  regard this explanation   as “mechanistic” in character, writing that the diagram 
shows how “ [I]n mechanistic terms, development proceeds as a progression of states of 
spatially defined regulatory gene expression”.    
 
III. 
 
What is it about the structures in Figures 1 and 2  that leads us to think of them as 
representing “mechanisms” and/or as providing “mechanistic explanations? In what 
follows, I will assume that mechanistic explanation is a form of causal explanation and 
that mechanism information includes even if it is not limited to information about causal 
relationships
1
. Thus, as a point of departure, we need some account of cause and causal 
explanation. Interventionists like me (Woodward, 2003) hold that causal claims like X 
causes Y (where X and Y are variables) are to be understood as claims about how the 
value or probability distribution of values of Y would change if an intervention were to 
occur that changes the value of   X: 
 (M): X causes Y in some background condition Bi (where background conditions 
are represented by variables distinct from X and Y) if  and only if there is a possible 
intervention on X in Bi such that if such an intervention were to occur,  the value of Y or 
the probability distribution of Y would change (cf. Woodward, 2003). 
                                                 
1
 I thus reject the idea, endorsed by some mechanists (e.g.,  Stuart Glennan, in his 1996) 
that one can appeal to the notion of mechanism to provide an account of what it is for a 
relationship to be causal. On my view this gets matters the wrong way around; the notion 
of cause is the more basic notion and information about mechanisms is information about 
causal relationships meeting further conditions.  
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 Here an “intervention” is to be thought of as an idealized, unconfounded 
manipulation of X  that occurs in such a way that Y is affected, if at all, only through this 
change in X and not via other causal paths that do not pass  through X.   Biological 
examples of manipulations that are (or may be) intervention-like include the gene 
perturbation  experiments employed by Davidson et al,  precisely targeted  ablation  
experiments in neurobiology,  and randomized drug trials.  It seems to me that (M) 
captures in a fairly straightforward way the notion of causal dependence that is 
represented by the arrows in Davidson’s diagram. If, say, in a perturbation that 
inactivates G1 in an intervention like-way, there is a corresponding change in some 
downstream feature like expression of gene G2, then we conclude that G1 causally 
influences G2 and draw an arrow from G1 to G2. (To anticipate a possible objection, if the 
effect of the perturbation of G1 is to activate  a  third  gene G3 that then plays a causal 
role in the expression of G2,  a more complex treatment is necessary—see Section 5 
below for discussion.)    
As in effect noted in connection with Figure 2, the information that (M) is 
satisfied is very non-specific;  it says only that Y depends in some way on X in some 
conditions, without telling us exactly how (in accordance with what functional form),  or 
in precisely what circumstances Y  depends on X.  We can provide a more detailed 
characterization of the XY relationship by devices like equations but we can also do 
this by providing a more precise specification of the range  of background circumstances  
under which the XY  relationship is stable (or invariant)2.   Suppose the XY  
relationship  satisfies M for some background circumstances Bi. (In this sense, we may 
think of the relationship as one of intervention-supporting counterfactual dependence 
between X and Y ). The stability of the X—> Y relationship under changes in background 
conditions has to do with the extent to which the relationship would continue to satisfy M 
under other  background circumstances different from Bi.  At one extreme,  the X—>Y 
relationship may satisfy M for some  Bi and yet  this relationship may be  highly unstable 
in the sense that  any one of a large number of changes or departures from in this 
background condition would disrupt the relationship between X and Y. At the other 
extreme, this relationship might be relatively stable, at least for many biologically 
“normal” changes.  True laws of nature  (fundamental physical relationships like those 
expressed by Maxwell’s equations) are extremely stable in this sense, but, in my view, 
few or no distinctively biological generalizations are sufficiently stable  or have a 
sufficiently wide range of applicability to be plausibly regarded as laws. Nonetheless 
biological generalizations can certainly differ in their degree of stability.  The 
relationship between possession of  more than forty CAG repeats in the Huntingtin gene 
and development of Huntington’s chorea is, unfortunately, very stable, both under 
environmental changes and variations elsewhere in the genome;  other gene phenotype 
relations  are far less stable under such changes. 
  Other things being equal (and they may not be), in providing explanations and in 
causal analysis,  both ordinary folk and scientists seem (as an empirical matter)  to prefer  
to appeal to relationships of counterfactual dependence satisfying M that are more rather 
than less stable or stable under  classes of changes  regarded as  particularly relevant  to 
the explanatory problem at hand.  In other words, explanations appealing to more stable 
                                                 
2
 For more on stability and invariance see Woodward, 2003, 2006.  
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dependency relationships tend to strike us as deeper or more satisfying.  Moreover, there 
are obvious normative or methodological rationales for this preference:  among other 
considerations, more stable relationships are more general and exportable to new 
contexts,  and knowledge of such relationships is more useful for purposes of 
manipulation and prediction.  
  Explanations that appeal to causal information that conforms to (M) fall into the 
general category of “difference-making” explanations: such explanations proceed by 
identifying factors which are such that changes or variations in those factors make a 
difference for their explananda; they answer what-if-things-had-been-different-questions. 
This picture of explanation allows for the possibility that difference-making factors may 
occur at many different “levels” of generality and abstractness. In some cases, the 
relevant difference-making factors may be very concrete and specific—it may  be that the 
presence of a protein with a very specific structure at a particular concentration is what 
makes the difference to some biologically significant outcome, in the sense that if a 
protein with a different structure or at a different concentration instead had been present, 
that outcome would not occur. In other cases, the difference-making factors may be 
“higher level” and less specific—perhaps some effect will be produced as long as a 
neural network with some overall pattern of connectivity is present, regardless of how 
this is implemented in detail, or an effect will follow as long as the concentrations of 
various proteins falls within certain broad limits. I will suggest below that is  these latter 
cases that  often strike us as comparatively “non-mechanistic”.  
 
IV. 
 
    How might these ideas about interventions,  stability, and difference-making be 
applied to   mechanistic explanation?  To fix our target, consider the following remarks 
by the biologists  von Dassow and  Munro which seem to me to capture many of the 
features commonly assigned to mechanistic explanation:  
 
Mechanism, per se, is an explanatory mode in which we describe what are 
the parts, how they behave intrinsically, and how those intrinsic behaviors of parts 
are coupled to each other to produce the behavior of the whole. This common 
sense definition of mechanism implies an inherently hierarchical decomposition; 
having identified a part with its own intrinsic behavior, that part may in turn be 
treated as a whole to be explained (Von Dassow, and Munro, 1999)   
 
     Suppose we are presented with some system S which exhibits behavior O in 
circumstances I, so that the overall input/output  relationship   (IO)  exhibits a 
dependency between I and O  that conforms to  M, but where little more  may be known 
about  this relationship. For example, it may be observed that headache relief depends 
(in the manner described by M) on whether or not one ingests aspirin, that turning the 
handle on a cash register is followed (eventually) by turnings of the pages of a book as 
in Figure 1, or that  development in some organism follows  a certain time course 
linking earlier to later stages.  I contend that at least in many case mechanistic 
explanations of the behavior of S exhibit the following structure: First, S is revealed to 
consist of components or parts, characterized by variables X1, Xk, where these variables 
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themselves stand in causal relationships (again in the sense captured by M) that serve as 
intermediate or intervening links along   causal paths running from I to O. In some cases, 
the structure instantiated by these intermediate steps may be very simple.  For example 
in figure 1, the causal structure of the apparatus is   one in which in the Input variable P 
= position of handle on cash register causes R= movement of register drawer causes M= 
motion of golf ball in a sequence leading to the page turnings T: P RM… T, 
where each of these intermediate causal relationships conforms to M. In the diagram 
constructed by Davidson et al. the intervening causal pathways are much more complex, 
but the same underlying principle of identifying mediating or intervening causal 
relationships among components is at work. In such more complex cases, an intervening 
structure in which various sorts of diverging and converging paths will be present—e.g., 
I causes X1 which causes X2 and X3, X2 and X3 cause X4 and so on.   
Phenomenologically, this provision of information about intermediate causal links 
gives one the sense of opening up the black box represented by the overall IO 
relationship.  The original relationship may strike one as arbitrary or puzzling (or at least 
one may not understand why it holds): why should ingesting a small white pill make 
one’s headache go away, why should pulling on a register handle turn the pates of the 
book?  Revealing the intermediate links and intervening variables by which I causes O 
serves to help to dispel this puzzlement, providing what seems like a “deeper” 
explanation for why the I—> O relationship holds.  
But why (or in virtue of what) should we think the information just described  as 
furnishes a deeper understanding of what is going on?  Here I would appeal to three, 
interrelated ideas, which I will discuss in turn: 1) Stability, 2) Modularity, and 3)  Fine-
Tunedness  of Organization, spatio-temporal and otherwise.    
  4.1) Stability.  In successful mechanistic explanations, the generalizations 
describing intermediate links are typically expected to be (and often are) more stable than  
the overall I O relationship with which we begin.  There is an obvious although 
defeasible reason why we should expect this. Suppose, to take a particularly simple case,  
there are two intervening variables X1 and X2, so that  I X1  X2 O.  Absent the 
operation of additional factors, the IO relationship will only be stable under changes 
that fail to disrupt any of these four intervening links —the chain is no more stable than 
its least stable link.  By contrast, if, as often will be the case, some of the changes in 
background circumstances under which the  I X1  relationship is stable are different 
from the changes in background circumstances under which X1 X2 is stable,  and 
similarly for the other intermediate links,  then , ceteris paribus,  it will be reasonable to 
the expect that  each of these intermediate links, taken individually, will be more stable 
than the overall I O relationship. For example, in the case of the Rube Goldberg 
machine, the overall relationship between pulling the register handle and the turning of 
the book pages is (one would suppose) highly unstable—anyone of a large number of 
changes  (such as cutting of strings or wires, tilting the platform on which the golf ball 
rests so that the ball does not fall off its edge, shaking the apparatus vigorously etc.) will 
disrupt this relationship. (This instability can be connected to the explanatory 
unsatisfactoriness or shallowness, noted above, of appealing to the I O relationship by 
itself as an explanation of anything.)  By contrast, the intervening links in the operation 
of the apparatus, taken individually, are more stable, often considerably more so. Insofar 
as the exhibition of more stable dependency relationships leads to deeper explanations, 
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this consideration helps to account for our sense that the decomposition of the behavior of 
the apparatus into intervening links yields greater understanding of what is going on.  I 
take this greater stability of intervening links to be a characteristic feature of at least one 
kind of simple, machine-like behavior.  
  In the case of Davidson’s diagram, the individual causal links reflect facts about 
biochemical reactions and the rate equations that underlie these. If one were to take 
Davidson’s diagram at face value (that is, as a correct and complete description of the 
causal structure of the system), it seems natural to expect that these individual links   will 
be more stable than the overall developmental trajectory, on the basis of the same 
considerations that were at work in connection with the Rube Goldberg machine. If, as I 
take to be a genuine empirical possibility,  this is not the  case (and the overall trajectory 
of development is instead more stable and robust  than the individual links—see Section 
5) this might be interpreted as  an indication  that  Davidson’s  diagram has left 
something important out—perhaps there are other causal relationships, not represented in 
the diagram, which operate to sustain a robust developmental trajectory when the 
relations represented in the diagram are disrupted. I thus suggest that to the extent that the 
behavior of a system is   the result of causal relationships among components that are 
individually less stable than the system’s overall behavior one has departed from one 
kind of expectation that is naturally associated with simple machine like behavior.    
4.2. Modularity.  Modularity conditions can be regarded as one particular kind of  
stability condition, in which our concern is with whether individual causal relations are 
stable under changes in other sets of causal relationships
3
.  Suppose that an overall IO 
relation characterizing system S is represented as decomposed into intervening causal   
relationships among the components of S, where these relationships are described by a set 
of generalizations {Gi}.  I will say that this representation is modular to the extent that 
each of the individual Gi remain at least somewhat stable under interventions that change 
the other Gi.  Put informally, modularity (in this sense) has to do with the extent to which 
one can change or disrupt the causal relationships governing one subset of components in 
the system without changing or disrupting the causal relationships governing other, 
distinct subsets of components.  To the extent that an explanation/representation of the 
behavior of a system in terms of its components is modular, we can associate distinct 
operations or patterns of behavior or interaction with different subsets of components—
each such subset of causal related components continues to be governed by the same set 
of causal relationships, independently of what may be happening with components 
outside of that subset, so that the behavior is (in this respect) “intrinsic” to that subset of 
components. (Compare the quotation from von Dassow et al. above, with its emphasis on 
the “intrinsic” behavior of components—modularity seems to me to capture at least part 
of what is involved in their notion of “intrinsicness”.) To the extent this is the case, we 
can move a modules from one causal context to another and expect it to operate “in the 
                                                 
3
 There are a number of (apparently) different notions of modularity that are employed in 
biological discussion, with independent disruptability being just one of these. For 
example, structures whose parts or nodes are relatively densely casually connected and 
which are only sparsely connected to other such structures are also often described as 
modules. It is an interesting question how this notion relates to the independent 
disruptability notion on which I focus above.  
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same way”. The extent to which an explanation or representation is modular is, I believe, 
another dimension which is relevant to whether the explanation is “mechanical” or  
exhibits the system of interest as behaving in a machine-like way.  
Since this notion of modularity is easily (and often) misunderstood, it is worth 
spelling out in a bit more detail.  First,  as I think of modularity, it is a  feature of 
representations or explanations of the behavior of systems, rather than of the system 
themselves.   This allows for the possibility that one particular representation R of system 
S might be non-modular and another, different, perhaps more fine-grained representation 
R* of the same system S might be modular. (A representation of the brain in terms of 
coarse-grained psychological variables like “cognitive judgment” and “emotion” might 
be highly non-modular, a representation at the level of individual neurons more modular.) 
Second, like stability, modularity comes in degrees and is relative to a class of changes or 
interventions.  Generalization Gk characterizing the causal relationships among one 
subset of components might be stable under certain sorts of changes Ci in the causal 
relationships characterizing other subsets of components but not under other changes Cj  
≠ Ci  in these relationships. Or Gk might be stable under changes in some causal 
relationships elsewhere in the system but not under changes in other causal relationships. 
Or perhaps changes elsewhere change Gk but only in small or minor ways.  
Third, it is important to understand that modularity does not imply that if we 
disrupt some upstream component in a mechanism,  the downstream components will 
continue to produce the same outputs as before. Rather modularity has to do with the 
extent to which causal relationships governing subsets of components remain stable 
under changes in the relationships governing other subsets of components. Thus if the 
representation in figure 1 is modular, this implies that it is possible to disrupt or change 
the relationship described in step 3, perhaps by cutting the string that releases the bus in 
the intact mechanism, without altering the causal relationships that characterize the 
operation of other parts of the mechanism—for example, the relationship between the 
movement of the bus and the movement of the ball described in step 5. More specifically, 
if one were to cut the string in step 3, but then  intervene to move the bus down the ramp 
as described in steps 4-5 so that it strikes the ball appropriately, then (to the extent that 
modularity is satisfied) the rest of the apparatus  would continue to function as before—
that is, the causal relationship in step 5 would continue to hold. Of course if the string in 
step 3 is cut and no other changes occur, the inputs to all   steps downstream from step 3 
will be altered and the pages of the book will not be turned, but modularity is consistent 
with this.  Similarly, if  the representation  in figure 2 is modular, this implies that it is 
possible to alter the relationship between, eg, gene 1 and gene 2, without altering other 
relationships between other genes elsewhere in the system. Suppose that G1 influences 
the level of expression of G2 in accord with some generalization g12 and that G2 in turn 
influences G3 in accord with generalization g23.  A mutation in G1 to G1 * leads to a new 
generalization g12* describing the relationship between G1 * and G2.  Such a mutation 
may change the level of expression of G2, but   this is consistent with the system  being 
modular.  What modularity requires is that it be possible for the change from g12 to g12*  
to occur without a change in generalization  g23.  In terms of a graphical representation, 
this amounts to the idea that one can disrupt the arrows directed into one variable or node 
without disrupting or changing arrows directed into another variable.  
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It is also important to understand that  the claim that an explanation/representation   
is modular  does not require that causal interactions  be linear or additive. Suppose that X1 
and X2 cause X3 through some non-linear interaction characterized by g123 (X1, X2) = X3.   
As long as changes in g123 leave relationships elsewhere in the system involving other 
variables intact and vice-versa, the system counts as modular.   As an illustration, 
consider a hypothetical mechanism,  which contains, as a component, a match which is 
struck  or not  (S) in the presence or absence of oxygen (O), leading to ignition or not (I).  
When the match ignites, it is used to start a fire (F) which in turn boils water (B). The 
overall system is described by a set of generalizations, g1 which describes the relationship 
between S, O and I, g2 which describes the relationship between I and F, and g3 which 
describes the relationship between F and B. The relationship g1 is non-linear or non –
additive and involves an interaction effect: Striking the match has different effects on   F, 
depending on whether oxygen is present. Nonetheless this representation may still be 
modular: even if the relationship between S, O and F is disrupted (e.g. by soaking the 
match in water), the relationship between  I and F and between F and B may remain 
intact—if we could get the match to ignite in some other way it would still start a fire 
which would boil the water.  
  I emphasize this point because there is little doubt that many of the causal 
relationships that are present in biological systems are highly non linear and non-additive. 
If modularity implied linearity or additivity or the absence of interaction effects among 
components, it would not be a very useful notion for characterizing biological 
explanations. And if all mechanical explanations must satisfy a modularity condition  and 
modularity requires additivity, we  could conclude immediately that there are  very few 
mechanical explanations in biology.  This anti-mechanist conclusion strikes me as far too 
quick;   my contrary  view is  that there is no reason to hold that  explanations  involving 
non-linear or non –additive relationships  are for that reason alone non-mechanistic.  
 What then would constitute a failure of modularity? Consider the following 
hypothetical genetic regulatory network which is taken from Greenspan  2001 and 
discussed in Mitchell, 2009.     
 
 
 
The diagram on the left represents the form originally taken by the network.  
Greenspan supposes that an experimental intervention in the form of a knock-out 
experiment on the gene/node in the upper left guardant results in a global  re-organization 
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of the whole network, so that links elsewhere in the network, not involving the gene 
intervened on, are altered or removed and new links are introduced.  To the extent that 
this is the case, the representation of the original network is to that extent non- modular.   
This failure of modularity represents a violation of at least some of the expectations one 
naturally associates with mechanistic explanation. Greenspan’s diagrams do not conform 
to the ideal of explaining how a system behaves by decomposition   into components and 
behaviors intrinsic to these components.  Instead, at least as represented, how some of the 
components behave depends in a global,  “extrinsic” way on what is going on in other 
components.  
  I take it to be an empirical question whether the behavior of some biological 
system is best explained by means of a theory or representational structure that is 
relatively modular.   It seems to me plausible that for some systems the answer to this 
question is “no”—see section 5 below.  However,  in my view it would  be a mistake to 
dismiss the notion  of modularity or to regard it as biologically uninteresting merely 
because it fails to have universal application. Assumptions about modularity of various 
sorts are pervasive in contemporary biology, across contexts as different as genetic 
regulation, networks of protein interaction, and neurobiology
4
. Davidson et al. in the 
paper referred to above,  are quite happy to think of genetic regulatory systems as 
composed of “modules”  Moreover, they note that  the   project of “ inferring    “normal 
function from the results of perturbation” requires what are in effect modularity 
assumptions of various sorts—one needs to assume that  when one intervenes  locally on 
one set of components, other components continue  to operate in the same way if one is to 
learn anything about the intact system from such interventions As the contrast between   
systems in which such assumptions are satisfied and the system in Greenspan’s diagram 
illustrates, to the extent that a structure can be successfully represented as modular, this 
greatly facilitates the task of learning about the mechanism through experimental 
interventions  on its individual parts.  
4.3. Organization Sensitivity/Fine -Tunedness
5
.  I turn now to another feature that 
is present in at least many machines and mechanical explanations, which I will call 
                                                 
4
 To take a simple illustration, the fact that structures involved in gene regulation are 
often modular in the sense that they are capable of changing  (and do change) 
independently of the structural genes that they regulate has important implications for 
understanding evolution.   
5
 In a forthcoming paper that I became aware of as I was working on this essay, Levy and 
Bechtel also emphasize the contrast between, on the one hand, (1) explanations that 
identify very specific factors having to do with the detailed causal properties of 
components and the details of their spatio-temporal connections and, on the other,  (2) 
explanations that instead abstract away from those details, such as those that appeal to 
general patterns of network connectivity as difference-making factors. If I have 
understood them correctly, they regard both sorts of explanations as in some broad sense 
mechanistic, but putting this difference with the position taken in this essay aside (and, as 
noted above, the difference may be largely terminological), their attention to the 
difference between (1) and (2) and their view that explanations can take the form of (2) 
and not just (1) is very similar to the position taken in this essay. Levy and Bechtel also 
make the important point that explanations that exhibit fine-tunedness of kind (1) often 
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organization sensitivity or fine-tunedness. Roughly speaking, this is the idea that it is 
characteristic of many machines that the specific details of the causal properties 
possessed by the components, and the way in which those components are connected to 
each other, including their spatio-temporal relations, matter a great deal to the outcome 
produced, in the sense that if these features or organization were different, the outcome 
would be different.  For example,  if  one were to take the components that make up the 
Rube Goldberg apparatus in Figure 1 and  significantly change their spatial  relations, we 
would expect to change  the input/ output relationship  characterizing the original 
apparatus in a very substantial way.  A similar result would be expected, if one were to 
replace one or more of the components with other, different components with different 
causal properties.  A similar point holds for changes in the causal characteristics of the 
components in the network described in figure 2. In such a network, it is assumed that 
only very specific proteins will bind to promoter regions of particular genes and affect 
their regulations; replacing these with other proteins will greatly affect gene regulation.  
Similarly, physical interaction/contact of protein and promoter region is required; if the 
spatial layout of the regulatory network is altered in such a way that the appropriate 
protein is not able to reach the promoter region, this will alter gene expression and 
subsequent developmental events.  
   Not only is the overall behavior of typical mechanisms sensitive to the details of 
their spatio-temporal organization, but we also expect that there will be systematic 
relationships or correspondences between the causal relationships that characterize such 
devices  (when these are understood, as above, in interventionist terms) and spatio-
temporal facts about the relationships among components.  To take a very simple 
possibility if there is a causal chain running from X1 X2 X3, we naturally expect X2 to 
occur or be instantiated temporally between X1 and X3,  and when direct causal interaction 
requires spatial contact, we expect to find the component realizing X2 spatially between 
the components realizing X1 and X3. Failure to find such expected components or 
instantiations at appropriate spatio-temporal locations will often cast doubt on a proposed 
mechanistic explanation.  
  Another connection between difference-making and spatio-temporal 
organization concerns modularity. Typically, in mechanical or machine-like devices the 
independent disruptability of causal relationships that is characteristic of modular 
organization is paralleled by the spatial (or temporal) separation of the instantiation of 
those relationships. For example, our confidence that the device represented  in Figure 1 
is modular is connected to and supported by the observation that the different 
components are spatially separated in a way that allows for, e.g., interference with the 
relationship between the register handle and the movement of the golf ball without 
interference  with the relationship between the  movement of the  bus and the rubber ball  
in step 4. Of course spatial separation does not guarantee modularity but modularity is 
typically less likely to be present in the absence of the right sort of spatial and/or 
temporal separation.  Put differently, facts about spatio-temporal separation can give us 
                                                                                                                                                 
also describe interactions among components that have very different causal properties 
rather than interactions among components all of which have broadly the same properties 
such as molecules in a gas.  
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clues about how to decompose a system into parts and causal relationships governing 
these that are independently changeable, thus facilitating “mechanistic” explanation.   
 This sensitivity of typical machines to details of organization – to spatio-temporal 
relationships among components, and to just which components are present—is of course 
connected to and motivates the idea that it is important to make such details explicit in 
constructing mechanical explanations. For example, “mechanistic” details about just 
which enzyme is involved in the synthesis of a particular protein  and about exactly 
where such synthesis occurs are of scientific interest at least in part because of the 
assumption that, were a different enzyme involved or  were it delivered  to a different 
location, the behavior of the system would be different. To the extent that such details do 
not matter—to the extent that there is reason to think that some system would behave in 
the same way (for some   behavior of interest) even if the spatio-temporal organization of 
the components were changed considerably or even if some or many of the components 
were replaced with others with different causal properties—then the motivation for 
constructing explanations that focus on them is correspondingly diminished, at least on a 
conception of explanation according to which this involves the exhibition of difference-
making factors
6
.  Again, it seems to me that to the extent the behavior of a system is not 
such that it exhibits sensitivity to details of organization of the sort I have been 
describing, then it departs from at least some of the expectations we associate with 
machine-like behavior.  
 
V. 
 
So far we have identified several features that are characteristic of at least many 
mechanistic explanations, including decomposition into relatively stable sets of 
intermediate causal relationships involving spatio-temporally distinguishable 
components, where these intermediate causal relationships satisfy modularity conditions, 
and where specific details of the organization and causal properties of components matter 
to the outcome produced. I will assume in what follows that to the extent that a  purported 
explanation of the behavior of a system does not exhibit these features, that explanation is 
not mechanistic, or at least comparatively less mechanistic than explanations that do have 
these features.   
In thinking about such non-mechanistic possibilities, an important point of 
departure is the observation that may biological systems, from genetic regulatory 
networks to metabolic networks to nervous systems, exhibit a high degree of robustness 
which one can understand generically as preservation of function or some overall 
behavior under both internal changes and external environmental changes (cf.  Kitano, 
2004). I believe that it is in thinking about the various ways that such robustness of 
behavior might be explained that the possibility of explanations that lack some of the 
features often expected of mechanical explanations comes to the fore.   
                                                 
6
 In other words, we should distinguish the idea that we should cite such lower level 
details when they make a difference but not necessarily when they do not, from the idea 
that explanations that cite such details are always better, regardless of whether they make 
a difference, because they are more “fundamental” or because the real site of causal 
action is always at the level of basic chemistry and physics.  
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At a very general level one may distinguish several different ways in which 
biological robustness can be achieved. One possibility is that some behavior B   is 
ordinarily produced by structure S1 but that when S1 is disrupted, another, distinct  back-
up or fail safe system S2 becomes operative which  then produces B. This is how many 
machines of human design, such as aircraft control systems, achieve robustness. In the 
biological realm, what is sometimes called genetic redundancy has a similar character
7
.  
A surprisingly large number of genetic knockout experiments produce no noticeable 
phenotypic effect, even in cases in which it is known that the inactivated gene G1 causally 
contributes to some phenotypic trait P in normal functioning. In cases involving 
straightforward redundancy, this is due to the fact that some back up gene G2– perhaps a 
duplicate or near duplicate of G1—becomes operative when G1 is inactivated and 
contributes to P.  
Cases in which robustness is achieved through redundant back-up mechanisms 
conform fairly well to the requirements on mechanistic explanation described above.  As 
I explain in more detail elsewhere (Woodward, forthcoming), such examples can be 
given a straightforward interventionist treatment in terms of the behavior of the system 
under combinations of interventions and this maps into what might be done 
experimentally to disentangle the causal structure of a system with redundancy:  for 
example, one may detect the back-up role of G2 by intervening to knock out G1 and 
simultaneously  “wiggling” G2  and observing the consequences for P. In this sort of 
case, one still has the characteristic mechanistic pattern of decomposition of an overall 
input out relation   into intermediate causal links organized, where the details of how 
these are organized make a difference to the outcome achieved. Moreover, structures of 
this sort respect modularity: In carrying out the interventions described above, we assume 
that  knocking out G1 does not change the relationship between G1 and G2 or between G2 
and P which is what a failure of modularity would involve.   Typically in such cases this 
modular organization is paralleled by a spatial separation of G1 and G2 — this helps to  
makes it plausible that  the link between G1 and P can be disrupted without disrupting the 
G2  P link and conversely.   
I think that the most plausible examples of behavior that is not best explained 
mechanistically are cases of robust behavior for which the explanation of this behavior 
does not have to do with redundancy or the operation of well-defined back-up systems, 
but rather has some other basis.  Here are some possible cases: 
5.1) Robustness without Fine-tunedness. A system may exhibit robust behavior 
which is not the result of the fine-tuned organization of parts and components, and which 
                                                 
7
 Wagner (2005) clearly distinguishes between genetic redundancy in this sense and what 
he calls “distributed robustness” as alternative ways of achieving biological robustness. 
The latter involves systematic or network reorganization and/or structures (as when 
blocking a certain part of metabolic network leads to increased flow through other parts 
of the network in compensation) and/or structures whose output is not sensitive to exact 
values taken by variables, parameters or interactions (as when eliminating chemical 
reactions from metabolic networks has little effect on output or when a genetic regulatory 
network operates in the same way even though biochemical parameters characterizing the 
network change by an order of magnitude (p. 177). The latter are good illustrations of 
what I call robustness without fine-tunedness below.  
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is also not the result  of the operation of some causally and spatially distinct back-up 
module, as in cases of genetic redundancy.  Instead, the robust behavior is the result of 
the fact that the system is such that as long as many of the variables characterizing the 
system fall within certain very broad ranges the system exhibits the same behavior   and 
similarly for variations in spatial organization.  Spindle formation in mitosis, as portrayed 
by Dupré, is apparently an illustration of this. It turns out that there are many different 
pathways or causal factors involved in spindle formation; when one of these is disrupted, 
others continue to operate in such a way that normal spindle formation is achieved.  
Moreover, unlike cases of genuine redundancy, this is not a matter of one or more 
causally and spatially distinct back-up structures becoming activated when a primary 
structure is inactivated; instead the different factors influencing spindle formation are  
continually interactive and co-mingled, mutually modifying one another.  On Dupré’s 
view, the achievement of spindle formation is instead more like (or more appropriately 
modeled as) the settling of high dimensional system with a complex dynamics subject to 
many different constraints into a basin of attraction for the system. It is characteristic of 
this sort of dynamical explanation that it shows us that the dynamics of the system are 
such that the system will settle into the same outcome state for any one of a very large set 
of combination of values for the state- variables characterizing the system—in this sense 
the particular values taken by those variables or the particular initial conditions in which 
the system begins or its particular trajectory through phase space which leads to the final 
outcome do not matter, at least to the extent that  all  we want to explain is why that 
outcome is achieved, one way or another. To the extent that it is characteristic of 
mechanical explanation that it involves an exhibition of specific details of organization or 
particular values of variables and parameters that do “make a difference” to the behavior   
of the system, such dynamical-systems-type explanations do not seem very mechanical. 
Such dynamical systems explanations  also don’t seem to proceed by the decomposition 
into parts with intrinsic behaviors that is characteristic of modular styles of explanation
8
.    
As a second example, consider, (following Alon 2007) two competing models for 
the explanations of  “exact adaptation” in bacterial chemotaxis.  Adaptation refers to the 
ability of bacteria to adjust their motion in the presence of attractants  (or repellents) in 
such a way that their movements become independent of attractant levels. One possible 
explanation, involving what Alon calls a “fine-tuned” model, takes adaptation to result 
from “a precise balance of different biochemical parameters” (p. 143).  In this model,  
adaptation depends, among other things, on the precise level of the enzyme CheR which 
influences receptor activity (and hence motion) through methylation. A modest change in 
the level of CheR undercuts adaptation The second model, due to Barkai and Leibler 
                                                 
8
  Another striking example of a dynamical systems explanation can be found in Huang et 
al. (2005). In this paper, distinct cell fates are modeled as attractor states in a very high 
(2773) dimension gene expression state space.  The authors showed experimentally that 
triggering divergent patterns of gene expression resulted in initially divergent cell 
differentiation followed by convergence to a common outcome across many different 
patterns of gene expression. Again, the apparent message is that the details of the 
particular trajectory followed do not matter as long as the trajectory is in the basin of 
attraction of the dynamics. In this sense the explanation for cell fate in the paper is non-
mechanical.   
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(1997),  instead takes adaptation to be “robust” and “ to occur for a wide range of 
parameters”, including varying  levels of CheR.  (Alon, 143).  In this model, methylation 
by CheR occurs at a constant rate and adaptation occurs “because the concentration of 
active receptors  adjusts itself so that the demthylation rate is equal to the constant 
methylation rate”  (146).  If one  expects that the explanation of adaptation in chemotaxis 
will involve structures that are like those present in machines like clocks or the device in 
Figure 1, one presumably will be inclined toward the fine-tuned model. Nonetheless, 
experimental evidence supports the second, “robust” model.  Again, the second model 
departs from the “mechanical” paradigm of fine-tunedness, although in other respects it 
may still seem “mechanical” – for example, it describes how overall behavior results 
from components (receptors, enzymes etc.)  and  causal interactions among these,  where 
these interactions are characterized  by locally stable generalizations (e.g. equations 
specifying  how the concentration of active receptors depends on enzyme 
concentrations.)
9
        
  Topological   or network explanations. A second set of explanations that seem in 
at least some respects non-mechanical by the standards described above appeal to what 
might be described as topological considerations,  where this notion is used in an 
extended way to  include explanations that appeal to patterns of connectivity, as in 
graphical or network structures. (I take the notion of topological explanation from  the 
very interesting discussion in Huneman, 2010. I will add that I do not mean to suggest 
that such explanations will sharply distinct from those discussed under the Non-Fine –
Tunedness heading immediately above). The characteristic idea behind such explanations 
is that the difference-making factors for certain explananda are relatively abstract systems 
level facts about, e.g.,  generic features of patterns of connectivity in which components 
stand or about the overall shape of the space of solutions of the equations governing the 
system,  rather than either more specific causal properties of those components  or very 
specific details of spatio-temporal relationships among those components. Thus it may be 
that as long as the components interact (in any way) that conforms to  a pattern of 
interaction that exhibits a certain topology ,  various outcomes follow.  Or it may be that  
the difference-making features involve the combination of the pattern of overall 
connectivity and certain qualitative features of the connections such as whether they are 
excitatory or inhibitory,   but not the precise functions governing the behavior of the 
components. In ecology, networks of interaction among species may be specified 
independently not just of the specific species standing in those network relations,  or the 
specific causal details of how these species interact, but even independently of whether  
the occupants of these roles act as predator  or as prey. It is then suggested that as long as 
such networks have various generic properties  they will have various other properties of 
interest to ecologists.  For example, networks that are scale –free (that is, that exhibit the 
same pattern of connectivity at all scales) are conjectured to have the property of being  
relatively robust against random deletions of nodes and connections (corresponding to 
extinctions in ecological contexts) .  Similar explanations that appeal to generic  features 
of networks have also been used  in neurobiology (e.g., Sporns, 2011), in a project of  
classifying different possible sorts of neural networks in terms of generic connectivity 
properties and  then investigating  other  features that are present just as a consequence of 
                                                 
9
 In fact Alon himself describes the second model as the Baikai-Leibler “mechanism”.     
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these connectivity properties. For example, many neural structures seem to be organized 
as  “small world”  networks in which most nodes are not directly linked to one another 
but nonetheless can be reached by relatively short paths.  Such networks are conjectured 
to have, merely in consequence of their small world organization, a number of other 
features of neurobiological interest—for example, in addition to being unaffected by 
random deletion of edges, as is also the case with the ecological networks mentioned 
above, such small world networks are also thought to be more evolvable than alternative 
forms of network organization.  As is perhaps obvious, accounts that appeal to network or 
topological properties are particularly appealing insofar as what we are trying to explain 
are why biological systems exhibit the robustness properties that they do, since the 
characteristic feature of such explanations is that they show us that as long as the relevant 
network/topological features are preserved, other sorts of changes or perturbations to the 
systems in question do not affect their behavior
10
.   
   An obvious question that arises in connection with such examples, which is 
particularly likely to be pressed by those who favor restricted conceptions of mechanistic 
explanation, is whether we should we think of them as explanations at all. This is large 
question that deserves a more detailed answer than I can provide here, but, very briefly, I 
would argue for an affirmative answer by appealing to the general interventionist 
framework   for understanding explanation described in section 3. In particular,  
successful dynamical systems and topological  explanations have the following 
properties: First,  they locate difference-making features  for (or answer what-if-things-
had- been different questions with respect to)  their explananda, exhibiting dependency 
relationships between those explananda and factors cited in their explanantia. For 
example, an explanation that appeals to network structure may show us that changing 
generic features of the connectivity of a network will change the outcomes produced by 
the network, while changes within the network that do not change this connectivity will 
have little or no effect. Second, such dependency relationships are, in the examples 
discussed, stable or invariant, in the sense that the relationships continue to hold under 
ranges of changes in other background conditions—e.g., as long as an network ecological 
network is scale-free, it may be robust under deletion of edges, independently of a range 
of other changes.  Sometimes these dependency or difference-making relationships can 
be given an interventionist interpretation in the sense that they encode information about 
what would happen under possible manipulations. For example, one may think of many   
explanations that appeal to network structure as telling us what would happen if one were 
to manipulate generic features of that structure, by removing or adding edges.  In other 
cases, although one can think of the dependency relations in questions as telling us what 
would happen if various factors (e.g., having to do with network structure or  the shape of 
an attractor landscape)  were different,  but the notion of interventions or manipulations 
that change  those factors may make less sense—perhaps such manipulations are either 
not physically possible or because they are unlikely to meet the conditions for a local, 
surgical intervention. In such cases, one may have difference-making relations or 
dependencies without an interventionist interpretation, as briefly discussed in Woodward, 
2003 pp. 220-1.  
                                                 
10
 This point is emphasized by Huneman, 2010.  
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  Throughout this paper I have resisted the impulse to enlarge the notion of 
mechanism in such a way that all explanations in biology automatically turn out to be 
“mechanistic”.  Only by adopting a notion of mechanism that is restricted in some way   
can one even raise questions about the scope and limits of mechanistic explanation. My 
view is that mechanistic explanations are most likely to be successful when the systems 
to which they are applied satisfy certain empirical presuppositions, having to do with the 
possibility of decomposition into stable intervening links, modularity, fine-tunedness and 
so on; as one moves away from contexts in which these presuppositions are satisfied, 
mechanistic explanation becomes a less promising strategy. This is not intended as a 
criticism of mechanistic explanation in those circumstances in which it is appropriate, but 
rather simply reflects the point that, like virtually all explanatory strategies and structures, 
there are limits on its range of application.   
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